Reciprocity-driven Sparse Network Formation by Tsoukatos, Konstantinos P.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
10
12
2v
1 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 29
 M
ay
 20
17
1
Reciprocity–driven Sparse Network Formation
Konstantinos P. Tsoukatos
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Technological Education Institute of Thessaly, Greece
Abstract
A resource exchange network is considered, where exchanges among nodes are based on reciprocity.
Peers receive from the network an amount of resources commensurate with their contribution. We
assume the network is fully connected, and impose sparsity constraints on peer interactions. Finding the
sparsest exchanges that achieve a desired level of reciprocity is in general NP-hard. To capture near–
optimal allocations, we introduce variants of the Eisenberg–Gale convex program with sparsity penalties.
We derive decentralized algorithms, whereby peers approximately compute the sparsest allocations,
by reweighted ℓ1 minimization. The algorithms implement new proportional-response dynamics, with
nonlinear pricing. The trade-off between sparsity and reciprocity and the properties of graphs induced
by sparse exchanges are examined.
Index Terms
Network formation, proportional-response, nonlinear pricing, sparse interactions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented increase in wireless traffic poses significant challenges for mobile operators,
who face extensive infrastructure upgrades to accommodate the rising demand for data. To ease
strain on networks, a viable alternative seeks to take advantage of already deployed resources,
that presently remain underutilized. For example, in device-to-device communications, devices in
close proximity may establish either direct links, or indirect communication via wireless relays,
altogether bypassing the cellular infrastructure. In recently launched Wi-Fi internet services,
e.g., FON (fon.com), Open Garden (opengarden.com), Karma (yourkarma.com), sharing wireless
access is a prominent feature, and subscribers are rewarded for relaying each other’s traffic. In
all these scenarios, it is important to design mechanisms which foster cooperation and encourage
user contribution, in ways that realize fair and efficient use of pooled resources.
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2In this paper, we study a network exchange model, where collaborative resource consumption
is based on reciprocation. Incentive mechanisms based on reciprocation have been proposed in
the context of peer-to-peer and user-provided networks [1], [2]. Participant nodes earn credits (or
virtual currency) for assisting other nodes in transmitting their data to the destination. Ideally,
reciprocation implies that each peer receives back from the network an amount of resources
or utility equal to what he contributed to other users. However, such perfect reciprocation may
in general not be feasible, due to constraints arising from network structure/connectivity, and
differing resource endowments possessed by nodes, also depending on their position in the
network graph. Moreover, peers can typically maintain a limited number of connections (in the
popular BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol users upload to at most four peers). Hence, it seems
reasonable to explore situations where graphs representing exchanges of resources among peers
are in some sense sparse.
The exchange model considered in this paper builds upon the so-called linear Fisher market
in economics (see [3], [4], [2] and references), where each participant aims to receive as much
resources as possible from the market. In this model, the optimal resource allocations are captured
by a classic convex program discovered by Eisenberg and Gale in 1959 [5]. In the context
of peer-to-peer bandwidth trading, the authors in [3] proposed a simple distributed algorithm
called proportional–response, that computes solutions to the Eisenberg–Gale program, hence
also equilibrium allocations in the resource exchange model: At every time slot, each peer
distributes his available resource to other peers in proportion to the resources it received from
them in the previous time slot.
Here, we formulate an optimization problem that balances benefits from reciprocation with
fixed per-link costs, therefore induces peers to maintain only a few active connections. Clearly,
rational peers will not engage in an exchange if costs out-weight potential benefits. We impose
sparsity penalties on peer interactions, to reflect the fact that peers often cannot afford the cost
of establishing and maintaining a link, the associated communication overhead, etc. fixed costs,
or are simply limited by physical constraints, such as limited range of wireless devices. This
reciprocity versus sparsity optimization is solved by decentralized tit-for-tat algorithms, whereby
peers communicate bids for each other’s resource, so as to approximately compute the sparsest
allocations, achieving close-to-perfect reciprocation. Our algorithms implement nonlinear pricing,
and extend the proportional–response dynamics of [3] to reinforce interactions where large
amounts of resources are exchanged. Starting from a complete graph, the algorithms prescribe
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3how nodes can gradually form a network of exchanges, that progressively gets sparser. As a result,
the proposed schemes suggest a network formation model where directed graphs, representing
sparsity-constrained resource exchanges, are constructed. The graphs may manifest either direct
reciprocation between peers, i.e., both edges (i, j) and (j, i) are typically present in the network
graph, or indirect reciprocation, in which case most of the edges do not have their reverse in the
graph. We illustrate the formation of resource exchange networks by peers who achieve almost
perfect reciprocation with only a small number of connections, and discuss the properties of the
sparse graphs in several numerical examples.
From a mathematical standpoint, the sparse exchange algorithms are derived by applying
majorization-minimization [6], [7] and reweighted ℓ1 minimization [8] to a combinatorial prob-
lem, and optimize the trade-off between reciprocation and sparsity up to a local optimum. Starting
from different initial conditions, different local optima arise, corresponding to different resource
allocations and sparse exchange graphs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND BACKGROUND
Consider a network ofN peers who exchange resources over a graph G describing connectivity.
Exchanges take place only between peers that are neighbours in the graph G. Each peer allocates
spare resources to other peers, in exchange for their resources (in the future). There exists a
single resource/commodity in the network. Peers spend their own spare resource for acquiring
resources, i.e., there is no monetary budget. Let ai be the resource endowment of peer i. Let
xij(t) be the amount of resource allocated from user j to user i at time t = 0, 1, . . .. Vector
xi denotes the allocations of peer i, and x−i denotes the allocations of all others. Each peer i
allocates the entire budget ai to his neighbours, ai =
∑
j 6=i xji, and receives in return a total
amount ri(x−i) :=
∑
j 6=i xij of resource. We assume peers value only the resource received from
others (not their own spare resource). That is, utility is linear in the amount of received resources
Ui(ri) = ri, and each peer i = 1, . . . , N , allocates resources to solve
(PEER) max
xi≥0
ri(x−i) subject to
∑
j 6=i
xji = ai.
These N (PEER) problems are intertwined, because each peer’s utility depends on resources
received from other peers.
Notation: Subscript in allocation xij is understood as given from j to i, similarly bij is the
bid of peer j for resource of peer i, and µij the price peer j charges to i.
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Fig. 1. Exchange network with 4 nodes. Left: Complete graph. Middle, right: Graphs with minimum number of links.
Motivation. In this paper, we consider an exchange network where the connectivity graph G
is complete. Every node can, in principle, engage in exchanges with everybody else. However,
we assume that establishing and maintaining exchange links carries a cost, so that peers tend
to limit the number of their active connections. This is often the case in practice, where peers
choose a few trading partners and avoid spreading themselves thin, so as to reduce overhead,
friction etc. costs associated with exchanges. Limits on the number of connections may also arise
due to physical or protocol constraints (e.g., in the BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol). In a slightly
different context, reducing transaction costs is a motivation for sparse portfolio selection [9].
Here, in a similar spirit, we use a penalty term that encourages peers to form sparse connections.
Our goal is to develop a quantitative model for dynamic formation of exchange networks driven
by reciprocation, where the directed graphs representing exchanges are sparse.
Example. The example network of Figure 1 illustrates the graphs implementing sparse
exchanges. All four nodes a, b, c, d have resource endowment equal to 1. Perfect reciprocation
can be realized in infinitely many ways, across the 12 links of the complete graph (left). The
sparsest exchange graphs, where each peer gives to exactly one peer 1 unit of resource, consist
of only 4 links, arranged either in ring (middle) or pairs (right), whence we also see the sparsest
solution need not be unique. In addition, the pairs configuration of Figure 1 shows that the
sparsest solution may partition the (initially complete) graph into disconnected components.
Previous work. We recap several useful results from a large literature. Exchange network is
an instance of a linear Fisher market, for which an equivalent convex formulation was given by
Eisenberg and Gale (1959) [5]:
max
x
∑
i
ai log ri subject to
∑
j 6=i
xji = ai, ∀i. (1)
The objective in (1) resembles the familiar proportionally-fair allocation, where each peer i
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5receives an amount of resources ri proportional to his contribution ai. It is also similar to
Kelly’s NETWORK problem [10], if the contributions ai are viewed as payments. The receive
vector r achieving optimality in (1) is unique, however the optimal allocation x is not unique,
because the objective in (1) is not strictly concave in x. That is, the same optimal receive
vector may be realized with different allocations. The equivalence between (PEER) and (1) can
be established as follows. Let ρj be the price at which peer j “sells” its resource (although
no actual monetary payments mediate the exchange). User i, by allocating amount xji to j,
“purchases” back xij = xji/ρj . Hence, the total resource received by user i is ri =
∑
j 6=i xji/ρj .
Therefore, to maximize utility in (PEER) user i allocates resources to (and consequently receives
resources xij > 0 from) only peers with the largest 1/ρj , i.e., the cheapest neighbors,
xij > 0 if and only if ρj = min
k∈Ni
ρk, (2)
where Ni is the set of neighbors of i. Now, to find the prices ρ, consider the convex program
(1), relax the constraints and write the Lagrangian
L(x,ρ) =
∑
i
ai log ri +
∑
i
ρi(ai −
∑
j 6=i
xji).
The KKT conditions at the saddle point of the Lagrangian imply that either
xij = 0 and
∂L
∂xij
< 0 in which case
ai
ri
< ρj ,
or
xij > 0 and
∂L
∂xij
= 0 in which case
ai
ri
= ρj .
From the equations above we deduce that xij > 0 if and only if ρj = mink∈Ni ρk, which is
precisely condition (2). Therefore, allocations x and prices ρ solving (PEER) can be computed
through the Eisenberg–Gale program (1).
Define the exchange ratio for each peer i as the ratio of the resources ri peer i receives, over
the ai he allocates to others. Since xij = xji/ρj , by summing over i we get aj = rj/ρj , that is
ρj =
rj
aj
, ∀j.
Hence, the exchange ratio coincides with the Lagrange multiplier/price ρ in the Eisenberg–Gale
program (1). May use the term price and exchange ratio interchangeably.
When network connectivity is given, we summarize the following facts from [2], [3], [4], [11]:
Network graph decomposes into components, and resource exchanges take place only within each
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6component. Since the exchange ratio is also the price (Lagrange multiplier) at which each node
sells its resource, peers with high exchange ratio are expensive and more constrained, i.e., “poor”
and struggle to contribute more resources. At equilibrium, rational peers exchange resource only
with their minimum price (cheapest/most generous) neighbours. Exchange can be viewed as a
reverse auction: Acting as sellers, peers compete to sell their resource by lowering their prices
(raising their bids), whereas, in the role of buyers, they purchase resource from the cheapest
(highest “bang-per-buck”) neighbor. Moreover, the prices of peers who exchange resources with
each other are inversely proportional. That is, the price at which a node buys resources from
peers is equal to the inverse of the price at which he sells his own resource. The upshot is that,
by measuring his own price, each peer can infer the price of the peers he exchange resources
with. In particular, inexpensive nodes (with prices smaller than one) know they interact with
expensive nodes (with price larger than one).
New connections. Previous work typically analysed exchanges in networks where connectivity
and resource endowments were a priori fixed and immutable. Then, due to the existing connec-
tivity and neighbouring node endowments, certain nodes may end up receiving significantly less
resources than what they contribute to their peers. Unless it is possible to alter either connectivity,
or node resource endowments, rational peers with exchange ratio much lower than one have little
incentive to engage in exchanges and contribute. Lack of participation will decrease the total
amount of resources contributed to the network, i.e., is detrimental to social welfare.
Rational nodes with low prices are motivated to seek out new peers, who are less expensive
than the ones they presently interact with. Neighbor selection by a Gibbs sampling algorithm
was proposed in [2]. By connecting with richer peers, inexpensive nodes receive more resources,
hence their exchange ratio (which is also their price) increases. Along the way, inexpensive peers
become more expensive, thereby also less attractive as candidates for resource exchange. In a
fully connected network, whenever perfect reciprocity is possible, this balancing act may drive
all exchange ratios (prices) to one, i.e. all nodes receive from the network an amount of resources
equal to what they contribute – perfect reciprocation.
III. NETWORK FORMATION PROBLEMS
Starting from a complete network, we allow peers to gradually form an exchange graph
that progressively gets sparser. First, we discuss centralized optimization problems, that aim
to identify the sparsest interactions that guarantee a desired level of reciprocation. Then, we
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7introduce variants of the Eisenberg–Gale program (1), where the objective is to balance benefits
from equitable allocations with fixed per-link costs, hence form only a few connections. These
formulations lead to distributed algorithms that enable peers to compute sparse exchanges in
a decentralized manner, by communicating bids for each other’s resource. The algorithms are
simple and natural to understand.
A. Sparse Exchanges with Reciprocation Guarantees
Let ||x||0 denote the pseudo-norm that counts the number of nonzero entries in x.
Problem P0. The objective is to find sparsest allocations that achieve a minimum exchange
ratio at least θ, where θ ≤ 1:
(P0) min
x
||x||0 s. t.
∑
j 6=i
xji = ai,
ri
ai
≥ θ ∀i. (3)
This is a combinatorial problem (assuming the minimum desired level θ of reciprocity is feasible),
hence intractable. To find an approximate solution, we may replace the nonsmooth ||x||0 norm
by a smooth proxy. A typical choice, justified by the limit
1 {|x| 6= 0} = lim
ǫ↓0
log(1 + |x|/ǫ)
log(1 + 1/ǫ)
,
is given by the logarithmic approximation ℓ(x) :=
∑
i,j log(ǫ+ xi,j), leading to the problem
min
x
ℓ(x) s. t.
∑
j 6=i
xji = ai,
ri
ai
≥ θ ∀i. (4)
Hence, the combinatorial objective in (3) has been substituted by a minimization of a concave
function (4). This is again hard, and can be tackled as follows.
Problem P1. Successively minimize a linear upper bound to the logarithm in (4), given by
min
x
x
T∇ℓ(x(t)) s. t.
∑
j 6=i
xji = ai,
ri
ai
≥ θ ∀i, (5)
formed around the previous solution x(t), for t = 0, 1, . . .. This amounts to solving a series of
linear programs to find a local minimum, hence can be computed efficiently. Moreover, to avoid
getting trapped in local minima, a small random perturbation may be employed.
Problem P2. Instead of bounding the logarithm in (4) with a linear upper bound, we bound
with a quadratic. More specifically, it holds that log(ǫ+ x) ≤ q(x, x¯) + k, where
q(x, x¯) :=


x2/(2δ(ǫ+ δ)), 0 ≤ x ≤ δ
x2/(2x¯(ǫ+ x¯)), x > δ,
(6)
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8for appropriate constant k and small δ > 0. Starting from an iterate x(t), we use (6) to bound
(4) and get a quadratic program in x:
min
x
∑
i,j
q(xij, xij(t)) s. t.
∑
j 6=i
xji = ai,
ri
ai
≥ θ ∀i. (7)
Problem (7) subsequently reduces to a linear system computing 2N multipliers from 2N linear
equations. As in (5), we apply the majorization-minimization procedure [8], hence solve a
sequence of quadratic programs to obtain the final solution (IRLS algorithm). Instead of solving
each quadratic program completely, we may run one (or a few) iterations towards solution (e.g.
fixed-point iteration) of linear system. We anchor a new upper bound to the computed allocations,
and resume iterations for the updated linear equations.
The solutions discussed above are centralized. In the following, we focus on distributed
algorithms, obtained by balancing reciprocation with a penalty that encourages sparse exchanges.
B. Eisenberg–Gale Program with Sparsity Penalty
We consider an Eisenberg–Gale program (1) augmented with a sparsity promoting term
(EG) max
x
∑
i
ai log ri − c
∑
i,j
log(ǫ+ xij)
subject to
∑
j 6=i
xji = ai, ∀i.
(8)
Optimization (8) is nonconvex because the objective is a difference of two concave functions.
We will derive a distributed algorithm that computes an approximate solution. First, relax the
constraints, introduce the multipliers λ and write the Lagrangian
L(x,λ) =
∑
i
ai log ri − c
∑
i,j
log(ǫ+ xij) +
∑
i
λi(ai −
∑
j 6=i
xji).
The dual optimization requires solving the relaxed primal
max
x
L(x,λ). (9)
A local maximum for (9) can be determined in a iterative fashion using majorization-minorization.
To that end, we bound the logarithms log(ǫ+ xij) using
log y ≤ log y0 +
y − y0
y0
. (10)
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9Next, with a logarithmic change of variables x˜ij := log xij , define the function
φ(x˜) :=
∑
i
ai log(
∑
j 6=i
ex˜ij),
so that φ(x˜) =
∑
i ai log ri(x). The convexity of the log-sum-exp function [12, page 74] implies
that φ is convex in x˜, therefore it holds that
φ(x˜) ≥ φ(x˜(t)) + (x˜− x˜(t))T∇φ(x˜(t)). (11)
Making use of inequalities (10) and (11), we lower bound the Lagrangian L by a surrogate
function g anchored at x˜(t),
L(x˜,λ) ≥ g(x˜|x˜(t)),
constructed as
g(x˜|x˜(t)) := φ(x˜(t)) + (x˜− x˜(t))T∇φ(x˜(t))
−c
∑
i,j
(log(ǫ+ ex˜i,j(t))− 1)
−
∑
j
(
λj + w(e
x˜ij(t))
)
ex˜ij . (12)
The weights w above are defined as in [8] by
w(x) :=
c
ǫ+ x
. (13)
Function g(x˜|x˜(t)) in (12) is concave in the transformed allocations x˜ and easy to maximize.
Successive maximization of the lower bound (12) yields the iteration
x˜(t+ 1) = argmax
x˜
g(x˜|x˜(t)),
where, at each time t = 0, 1, . . ., multipliers λ are also updated to satisfy the node endowment
constraints in (8). We differentiate (12) with respect to x˜, transform back to the x domain, and,
after some algebra, arrive at the following solution:
Each peer i communicates at time t = 0, 1, . . . its exchange ratio
ρi(t) :=
ri(t)
ai
(14)
to other peers.
Let the bids of peer j for peer i’s resource be
bij(x(t), λi) :=
xji(t)
ρj(t)
1
λi + w(xji(t))
, (15)
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where the weights w are defined in (13) and λi is the multiplier associated with the budget
constraint for peer i. In market terms, bij is the amount of resource peer i can purchase from j
at price (per unit) ρj(t)(λi + w(xji(t))) by paying xji(t). Note that pricing is nonlinear; price
per unit decreases as payment xji(t) increases, and asymptotically drops to λiρj(t) as payment
xji(t) goes to infinity.
Each peer i selects λi to exhaust the entire budget
ai =
∑
j 6=i
bij(x(t), λi), (16)
this can be computed by bisection search. Check that if endowment ai of peer i is large, then,
all other quantities in (16) remaining fixed, multiplier λi (which is also the price associated with
i’s endowment) will be small, i.e., peer i will be less resource constrained, as expected.
Finally, peer i allocates resources to j proportionally to bids
xji(t+ 1) = bij(x(t), λi) (17)
where the bids bij are defined by (15) and multipliers λi solve (16). This is a proportional-
response with nonlinear price discrimination. We call the algorithm an EG-sparse proportional-
response (EGsPaRse).
Algorithm 1 Eisenberg-Gale Sparse Proportional Response (EGSPARSE)
1: Initialization (time t = 0): Peers allocate resources x(0) either equally or randomly.
2: repeat
3: Each peer i computes its exchange ratio ρi(t) (14) and communicates it to the network.
4: Each peer i determines the bids bij(t) for its resource from (15), where the multiplier λi
solves (16).
5: Each peer i allocates resources xji(t+ 1) according to (17)
6: t← t + 1
7: until Convergence
When there is no sparsity-promoting penalty c = 0, the recursion becomes
xij(t+ 1) = aj xij(t)
ai
ri(t)
/∑
k 6=j
xkj(t)
ak
rk(t)
. (18)
Updates (18) coincide with the standard proportional-response dynamics of [3]. To verify this,
observe that iteration (18) corresponds to two steps of proportional-response: In the numerator,
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peer i reciprocates j by charging a constant per-unit price ri(t)/ai (linear pricing), likewise each
peer k in the denominator, and for peer j reciprocating i in the entire fraction.
In the general case c > 0, peers are required to communicate either their exchange ratio,
or the multiplier λ (which is also related to the exchange ratio). This implicitly assumes peers
declare their true ratio. In practice, peers may be unwilling to disclose their exchange ratio (due
e.g. to privacy) or strategically misreport it, to extract additional resources. Such strategic/non-
cooperative behaviour by peers who anticipate the effect of reporting their ratio may result in
loss of optimality.
C. An Alternative Formulation: SPaRse Algorithm
We next turn to an alternative formulation, which leads to an intuitively appealing algorithm.
Recall the definition of the Kullback–Leibler divergence between two vectors,
D(u,v) :=
∑
i
ui log
ui
vi
−
∑
i
(ui − vi), u,v ≥ 0.
Inspection of the Eisenberg–Gale program (1) shows it is equivalent to minimizing the divergence
D(a, r) between allocated a and received r resources (subject to constraints). It is natural to
wonder whether we may seek to minimize D(r, a) instead of D(a, r); although divergence is
in general not symmetric. It turns out that the former optimization also captures the optimal
allocations, a result due to Shmyrev [13] (see also discussion in [4]). The key advantage of
this alternative formulation is that it nicely fits the proportional-response dynamics. Hence, we
consider a convex program equivalent to (1), obtained from min
x
D(r, a), together with a sparsity
penalty:
(S) min
x
D(r, a) + c
∑
i,j
log(ǫ+ xij)
subject to
∑
j 6=i
xji = ai, ∀i.
(19)
Optimization problem (19) is nonconvex; we will derive an algorithm that computes a local
minimum using the minorization-majorization procedure [7]. The updates can be expressed in
terms of a Bregman divergence Bh, associated with the convex negative entropy function h.
Definition 1: Let ψ : X → IR be a strongly convex function on a convex set X . The Bregman
divergence Bψ : X ×X → IR associated with the strongly convex function ψ is defined by
Bψ(u,v) := ψ(u)− ψ(v)− (u− v)
T∇ψ(v). (20)
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The Bregman divergence is a distance–like function, as it satisfies Bψ(u,v) ≥ 0 for all u,v,
thanks to the convexity of ψ. For example, ψ(u) = 1
2
||u||2 induces the usual Euclidean distance
Bψ(u,v) =
1
2
||u−v||2, however the Bregman divergence is in general not symmetric (for more
properties see e.g. [14]). The Bregman distance generated by the negative entropy
h(r) :=
∑
i
ri log ri, r ≥ 0, (21)
is the Kullback–Leibler divergence:
Bh(u,v) = D(u,v), u,v ≥ 0. (22)
This particular choice of Bregman function (instead of usual Euclidean distance) is motivated
by the fact that entropy better reflects the geometry of the simplex constraints [14], [4] (so that
the latter are easily eliminated).
Let f(x) be the objective function in (19). In the majorization step, a point x(t) is used to
anchor a surrogate function g(x|x(t)) which upper bounds f ,
f(x) ≤ g(x|x(t)), x ≥ 0,
and is easy to minimize. Function g is chosen to be tight at x(t), i.e., f(x(t)) = g(x(t)|x(t)).
In the minorization step, the upper bound is minimized with respect to x, generating a sequence
x(t + 1) = argmin
x
g(x|x(t)), (23)
for each t = 0, 1, . . . . We form the surrogate g(x|x(t)) as follows: Write the divergence D(r, a)
as
D(r, a) = h(r)−
∑
i
ri log ai − (ri − ai). (24)
Because of (22), negative entropy (21) satisfies
h(r) = h(r(t)) + (r− r(t))T∇h(r(t)) +D(r, r(t)). (25)
The divergence D(r, r(t)) in (25) is bounded using Lemma 1 (end of Section III). The logarithm
in (19) is bounded by the first-order Taylor expansion
log y ≤ log y0 +
y − y0
y0
, (26)
September 22, 2018 DRAFT
13
as is customary in the reweighted ℓ1 minimization [8] framework. Inserting (24) and (25) in the
objective (19) and taking into account inequalities (26) and (32) gives
g(x|x(t)) = D(x,x(t)) + h(r(t)) + (r− r(t))T∇h(r(t))
+c
∑
i,j
log(ǫ+ xij(t)) +
xij − xij(t)
ǫ+ xij(t)
−
∑
i
ri log ai − (ri − ai). (27)
The updated allocations x(t+ 1) are computed by minimizing the surrogate (27) in (23). After
some algebra, also making use of ∂D(x,x(t))/∂xij = log xij − log xij(t), we get
xij(t+ 1) = xij(t)
ai
ri(t)
exp
(
−
c
ǫ+ xij(t)
)
. (28)
Finally, allocations (28) are normalized to satisfy the endowment constraint
∑
i 6=j xij = aj
for each peer j. We thus arrive at a second algorithm for sparse proportional-response, where
nonlinear prices (with an exponential factor) are charged to users:
Each peer i computes the price µji(t) (per unit resource) charged to peer j 6= i at time
t = 0, 1, . . . as
µji(t) :=
ri(t)
ai
exp
(
c
ǫ+ xij(t)
)
. (29)
Pricing above is nonlinear, because µji(t) depends on the amount of resource xij(t) (payment)
offered to i, inside the exponential. The higher the resource xij(t) (payment) offered by peer
j to peer i, the lower the price µij(t) (per unit resource) charged to i, and the price converges
to the exchange ratio ri(t)/ai as payment xij(t) goes to infinity. Hence, the proposed dynamics
reinforce exchanges that involve large amounts of resources.
Next, each peer i communicates to other peers j the price µji(t). Peer i computes the bids of
other peers j for i’s resource as
bij(x(t)) :=
xji(t)
µij(t)
, j 6= i. (30)
This corresponds to the amount of resource with which j intends to reciprocate i. Alternatively,
peers can communicate directly the bids instead of prices. Bid bij is also the number of resource
units that peer i can purchase from j with total payment xji(t), at price µij(t).
Subsequently, peer i allocates his resource to peer j proportionally to the received bids,
xji(t+ 1) = ai
bij(x(t))∑
k 6=i
bik(x(t))
, j 6= i. (31)
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This is a proportional-response with nonlinear price discrimination, where larger amounts of
resource are “sold” at lower per-unit price (discount). We call this algorithm a Shmyrev-sparse
proportional-response (SPaRse).
Algorithm 2 Shmyrev Sparse Proportional Response (SPARSE)
1: Initialization (time t = 0): Peers allocate resources x(0) either equally or randomly.
2: repeat
3: Each peer i computes the nonlinear price µji(t) (29) (per unit resource) he charges to
each peer j, and communicates µji(t) to peer j.
4: Each peer i determines the bids bij(t) for its resource by peer j using (30).
5: Each peer i allocates resources xji(t+ 1) proportionally to bids (31).
6: t← t + 1
7: until Convergence
Each round of SPaRse has O(N2) computation and communication complexity. If there is no
sparsity penalty (set c = 0) we recover again recursion (18), which is the standard proportional-
response [3]. As will be seen in the numerical results of Section IV, the variant with Equal first
round allocation x(0) tends to generate graphs with mostly direct reciprocation, while Random
first round leads to indirect reciprocation, This is likely due to the fact that a random initial
allocation adds uncertainty and erases symmetry, so that it gets impossible to recover the more
orderly direct reciprocation.
The analysis above can be extended to address a slightly different model, where each peer is
constrained by the maximum number of active connections it can maintain at all time slots.
Lemma 1: For all x,y ≥ 0 it holds that
D(r(x), r(y)) ≤ D(x,y). (32)
Proof: Inequality (32) follows from the joint convexity of the function d(x, y) = x log(x/y)
in (x, y) and Jensen’s inequality [4].
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of the SPaRse proportional-response algorithm in several numer-
ical examples; EGsPaRse is omitted for brevity. The examples showcase the formation of sparse
exchange graphs by peers who communicate bids/prices in a distributed manner, and compute
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Fig. 2. SPaRse-Equal: Exchange graph in a N = 9 node network, T = 10, 000 iterations.
allocations that achieve close to perfect reciprocation (minimum exchange ratio near one). We
discuss the influence of the initial split (SPaRse-Equal versus SPaRse-Random variants) on the
properties of the induced graphs in terms of direct/indirect reciprocation, the role of the link
cost parameter c, and the temporal effects (number of iterations T ) on the sparsity and fairness
of the resulting allocations.
The SPaRse algorithm is applied to a 9-node network, where node endowments are shown in
the circles, i.e., node 1 endowment is 155.81. After 10, 000 iterations of SPaRse-Equal (with c =
0.1, ǫ = 0.01), a graph with 16 links is generated, shown in Figure 2, together with the computed
allocations xij . The minimum exchange ratio is 0.981, and the divergence between received and
allocated resources is D(r, a) = 0.125. We see the majority of links are bidirectional: Only links
1 → 6, and 6 → 5 do not have their reverse in the graph, so among these three nodes indirect
reciprocation takes place.
We next consider a 25-node network, with sample mean node endowment a¯ = 106.22 and
standard deviation std(a) = 53.48, drawn from a lognormal log ai ∼ N (4.5, 0.25) distribution.
We compare influence on the resulting allocations of the Random and Equal initial splits.
Figure 3 shows six sample paths of the SPaRse algorithm (with c = 0.2, ǫ = 0.01); solid
red line corresponds to Equal initial split of resources, and dashed blue lines correspond to
five Random initial splits. It appears that starting with Equal allocation requires more time to
converge. We see that, in general, convergence takes place to different allocations, and slightly
different minimum exchange ratios, which are larger than 0.9, not too far from 1. The top left
plot shows that the cardinality of the final allocation is roughly the same under both Random
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Fig. 3. SPaRse convergence in a N = 25 node network: Equal (solid) vs. Random (dashed) initial allocation.
and Equal, i.e., regardless of initial conditions. More interestingly, the bottom left plot in Figure
3 suggests qualitatively different behavior of the two variants: (a) SPaRse-Equal forms a graph
that implements direct reciprocation (number of reciprocal links is almost equal to total number
of links, at about 45); while (b) SPaRse-Random generates graphs that implement indirect
reciprocation, as there are very few reciprocal links.
The impact of different random initial allocations is quantified in the the same 25-node
network, and node endowments as Figure 3. We run SPaRse-Random 1, 000 times (with c = 0.1,
ǫ = 0.01), each time with a different random split of resources in the first round. Runs are 5, 000
iterations long, by then allocations have converged. We record four performance metrics: (i)
the cardinality of the final allocation (the number of directional links in the resulting exchange
network), (ii) the reciprocity (i.e., the number of links for which their reciprocal is also in the
graph), (iii) the minimum exchange ratio over the 25 nodes, and (iv) the divergence D(r, a)
between received r and allocated a resources. Figure 4 shows histograms and mean values
(vertical black line) for all 4 metrics. We see that SPaRse-Random usually achieves a minimum
exchange ratio larger than 0.92, with sparse graphs consisting of less than 50 edges, out of
25 × 24 = 600 totally in a complete graph with 25 nodes. The top histograms (cardinality of
x, reciprocity) once more indicate that graphs generated by SPaRse-Random manifest mostly
indirect reciprocation, since (on the average) only about 4 out of the 46 links are reciprocal.
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Fig. 5. SPaRse-Equal: Performance under different sparsity parameters c (N = 11 node network).
The role of sparsity parameter c is examined in Figure 5. In a N = 11 node network, five
endowment vectors are randomly drawn from the same lognormal distribution as before. For
each endowment vector we run SPaRse-Equal with different sparsity parameters c and record
the cardinality of the resulting allocation, and the divergence D(r, a), to get five cardinality
and divergence curves. The duration of each run is 104 iterations. As c decreases, the algorithm
computes more fair allocations (smaller divergence, larger minimum exchange ratio), but takes
longer to converge. Decreasing c below 0.05 (while average endowment is about 100) yields
close to zero divergence, i.e., perfect reciprocation (Figure 5, right). However, for c smaller than
0.05, and when computations stop after 104 iterations, we see that almost zero divergence is
accompanied by an increase in number of links in the graph (Figure 5, left).
The discussion above suggests that, by tuning the parameters c and ǫ, our model can generate
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Fig. 6. SPaRse-Equal: Exchange graph in a N = 9 node network, T = 500 iterations.
graphs with various levels of sparsity and reciprocation, which also evolve temporally as the
allocation of resources changes over the course of time. Apart from the static graphs that arise
after SPaRse converges, one may also take a snapshot of the network at some finite time, during
the transient. For example, at time t = 0 let us start with the 9-node endowments of Figure 2
and apply SPaRse in a complete graph, which sparsifies as time elapses. By stopping early after
500 iterations, we obtain the graph shown in Figure 6. This consists of 35 links (as compared
to 16 links in Figure 2), where only link 3 → 1 is not directly reciprocated (but has small
allocation 0.02). The minimum exchange ratio is 0.998, and divergence D(r, a) = 0.001, while
the respective values in Figure 2 were 0.981 and 0.125. Therefore, graph in Figure 6 is less
sparse than Figure 2, but realizes more fair exchanges. A common feature of the allocations in
both Figures 2 and 6 is that low endowment nodes apparently never exchange resources with
each other.
V. CONCLUSION
We studied a resource exchange network where exchanges among nodes are based on reci-
procity. To incorporate costs of establishing and maintaining active connections, we imposed
sparsity penalties on peer interactions. Finding the sparsest graphs that achieve a certain level of
reciprocation is in general NP-hard. We proposed decentralized algorithms, that enable peers to
approximately compute the sparsest allocations, by generalized proportional-response dynamics,
with nonlinear pricing. Numerical results illustrate the performance of the SPaRse algorithms and
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the formation of exchange graphs by peers who achieve close-to-perfect reciprocation (minimum
exchange ratio near one), in a network with a limited number of active connections.
REFERENCES
[1] G. Iosifidis, L. Gao, J. Huang, and L. Tassiulas, “Incentive mechanisms for user-provided networks,” IEEE Communications
Magazine, vol. 52, no. 9, pp. 20–27, 2014.
[2] M. Zubeldia, A. Ferragut, and F. Paganini, “Neighbor selection for proportional fairness in P2P networks,” Computer
Networks, vol. 83, no. 4, pp. 249 – 264, 2015.
[3] F. Wu and L. Zhang, “Proportional response dynamics leads to market equilibrium,” in Proceedings of the Thirty-ninth
Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, ser. STOC ’07, 2007, pp. 354–363.
[4] B. Birnbaum, N. R. Devanur, and L. Xiao, “Distributed algorithms via gradient descent for Fisher markets,” in Proceedings
of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, ser. EC ’11, 2011, pp. 127–136.
[5] E. Eisenberg and D. Gale, “Consensus of subjective probabilities: The pari-mutuel method,” Annals of Mathematical
Statistics, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 165–168, 1959.
[6] D. R. Hunter and K. Lang, “A tutorial on MM algorithms,” The American Statistician, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 30–37, January
2004.
[7] Y. Sun, P. Babu, and D. P. Palomar, “Majorization-minimization algorithms in signal processing, communications, and
machine learning,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 794–816, February 2017.
[8] E. J. Cande`s, M. B. Wakin, and S. P. Boyd, “Enhancing sparsity by reweighted ℓ1 minimization,” Journal of Fourier
Analysis and Applications, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 877–905, 2008.
[9] J. Brodie, I. Daubechies, C. De Mol, D. Giannone, and I. Loris, “Sparse and stable Markowitz portfolios,” Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 106, no. 30, pp. 12 267–12 272, 2009.
[10] F. Kelly, “Charging and rate control for elastic traffic,” European Transactions on Telecommunications, vol. 8, no. 1, pp.
33–37, 1997.
[11] L. Georgiadis, G. Iosifidis, and L. Tassiulas, “Exchange of services in networks: Competition, cooperation, and fairness,”
in Proceedings of the 2015 ACM SIGMETRICS, ser. SIGMETRICS ’15, 2015, pp. 43–56.
[12] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[13] V. I. Shmyrev, “An algorithm for finding equilibrium in the linear exchange model with fixed budgets,” Journal of Applied
and Industrial Mathematics, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 505–518, 2009.
[14] A. Beck and M. Teboulle, “Mirror descent and nonlinear projected subgradient methods for convex optimization,”
Operations Research Letters, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 167–175, May 2003.
September 22, 2018 DRAFT
